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PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE, SOURCES AND METHODS, THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF DCID NO. 1/14, DATED 23 JUNE 1967

CAM

BACKGROUND

A. THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY IN THE PERSONNEL SECURITY

CRITERIA FOR ACCESS TO COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE

WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY PFIAB ITSELF IN ITS STUDY OF THE

25X1A9a

CASE IN 1964 AND WAS ASSIGNED TO THE USIB SECURITY

COMMITTEE FOR ACTION.

25X1A9a

ESPECIALLY WHILE HE WAS ASSIGNED

TO THE ARMED FORCES COURIER SERVICE (ARFCOS) SERVED

TO RE-EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY IN THIS FIELD.

C. AFTER CONSIDERABLE INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION AS WELL AS CONSULTATION WITH OTHER USIB COMMITTEES

THE DCID WAS ISSUED IN 1967.

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2. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

- A. THE DCID ESTABLISHES UNIFORM PERSONNEL SECURITY

 APPROVAL CRITERIA INCLUDING THE SCOPE OF THE

 INVESTIGATION, FOR ACCESS TO ALL THE COMMUNITY'S

 COMPARTMENTED COLLECTION SYSTEMS (EXCEPT

 RESTRICTED DATA WHICH HAS STATUTORY CONTROL).
- B. THESE SYSTEMS REPRESENT OUR MOST SENSITIVE, MOST PRODUCTIVE AND MOST EXPENSIVE COLLECTION EFFORTS.
- C. THE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITH THESE CLEARANCES WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS STAGGERING:

25X9A2

SI:

25X1A2d1

TKH AND


APPROXIMATELY

25X9A2

3. IMPACT OF DCID 1/14 ON THE COMMUNITY

- A. ESTABLISHES, FOR THE FIRST TIME, COMMON PERSONNEL SECURITY CRITERIA AND UNIFORM INVESTIGATIVE REQUIRE-MENTS FOR ALL SYSTEMS.
- B. WILL FACILITATE SECURITY CERTIFICATIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.
- C. STRESSES THAT A SECURITY APPROVAL MUST BE A COMMON SENSE DETERMINATION BASED ON ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION.

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- D. CONTINGENT UPON "NEED-TO-KNOW," A PERSON CLEARED

 FOR ONE SYSTEM CAN NOW EASILY BE PROCESSED FOR

 ACCESS TO ANOTHER SYSTEM, SINCE THE STANDARDS ARE

 UNIFORM.
- E. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A PERIODIC (5-YEAR) RE-INVESTI-GATION IS A VALUABLE CI TOOL.
- F. AS A SIDE EFFECT, THE USIB APPROVED RECOMMENDATION
 THAT ALL PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO ARFCOS MEET DCID
 1/14 STANDARDS, WILL BOTH UP-GRADE ARFCOS SECURITY
 AND AT THE SAME TIME, PROVIDE GREATER SECURITY FOR
 THE COMMUNITY'S INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS CARRIED
 THROUGH ARFCOS CHANNELS.

4. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

- A. WITH DCID 1/14 ESTABLISHING A PRECEDENT, WE MAY EXPECT SOME PROGRESS TOWARD UNIFORMITY IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:
 - 1) THE PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT (PHS):

 A WORKING GROUP HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED

 TO EXPLORE THE FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING
 A COMMON PHS FOR THE COMMUNITY.

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- 2) PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS (MONEY IS

 A PERENNIAL PROBLEM IN THIS FIELD, BUT

 A START HAS BEEN MADE IN THE ACCEPTANCE

 OF A COMMON FORMAT FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY

 SURVEYS).
- 3) WITH THE EVER GROWING SOPHISTICATION OF
 COLLECTION METHODS, AND THE ACADEMIC
 BACKGROUND OF THOSE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE
 INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INVOLVED IN THESE
 PROGRAMS, SECURITY REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR
 ARTICLES, SPEECHES AND PARTICIPATION IN
 SEMINARS ARE MOST IMPORTANT. TO ATTAIN
 MORE UNIFORMITY IN THIS FIELD, A WORKING
 GROUP HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE
 SECURITY REVIEW PROCEDURES OF MEMBER AGENCIES
 TO ENSURE UNIFORMITY.
- 5. A SECURITY PROBLEM: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
 - A. THE ERVIN BILL (S-1035)

 A BILL TO PROTECT EMPLOYEES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

OF THE GOVERNMENT:

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- (1) TO ENJOY THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
- (2) TO PREVENT UNWARRANTED GOVERNMENTAL INVASION OF PRIVACY

B. STATUS

PASSED BY SENATE ON 13 SEPTEMBER 1967 BY AN OVER-WHELMING MAJORITY. INTRODUCED INTO THE HOUSE AND NOW IN COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE.

C. SALIENT POINTS IN BRIEF - PROHIBITIONS

- (1) TO DISCLOSE RACE, RELIGION OR NATIONAL ORIGIN
 OR THAT OF FOREBEARS. (INQUIRY CAN BE MADE
 WHEN DEEMED NECESSARY OR ADVISABLE TO
 DETERMINE SUITABILITY FOR ASSIGNMENT RELATED
 TO NATIONAL SECURITY WITHIN OR OUTSIDE U.S.).
- (2) TO MAKE ANY REPORT CONCERNING HIS ACTIVITIES

 OR UNDERTAKINGS UNLESS SUCH ARE RELATED TO

 PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES. (DOES NOT

 PRECLUDE IF THERE IS BELIEF OF OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES

 OR EMPLOYMENT IS IN CONFLICT WITH OFFICIAL

 DUTIES).

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- (3) TO SUBMIT TO INTERROGATION (WHERE INVESTIGATION IS FOR MISCONDUCT) WHICH COULD LEAD TO
 DISCIPLINARY ACTION WITHOUT PRESENCE OF
 COUNSEL OR PERSON OF CHOICE, IF REQUESTED.
- (4) TO DISCLOSE ANY ITEMS OF PROPERTY, INCOME,

 ETC. OR THOSE OF ANY MEMBER OF FAMILY UNLESS

 CONFLICT OF INTEREST IS INVOLVED.
- (5) TO SUBMIT TO ANY INTERROGATION OR EXAMINATION
 OR TAKE ANY PSYCHOLOGICAL TEST DESIGNED TO
 ELICIT INFORMATION (WITH ANY PERSON CONNECTED
 BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OR
 PRACTICES, ATTITUDE OR CONDUCT RE SEXUAL
 MATTERS). DOES NOT PRECLUDE SPECIFIC SEXUAL
 MISCONDUCT CHARGES MADE AGAINST THAT PERSON
 FOR WHICH AN OPPORTUNITY IS AFFORDED TO REFUTE
 CHARGE.
- (6) TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH TEST IN APPLYING FOR EMPLOYMENT DESIGNED TO ELICIT INFO AS GIVEN ABOVE.

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(7) TO REQUIRE PARTICIPATION IN ANY ACTIVITIES

OR UNDERTAKINGS UNLESS RELATED TO OFFICIAL

DUTIES.

D. IMPACT OF BILL ON SENSITIVE AGENCIES

- (1) LIMITS QUESTIONS INVOLVING NATIONAL ORIGIN OF APPLICANT, PARENTS, SPOUSE AND RELATIVES BY MARRIAGE, BLOOD OR ADOPTION. ESSENTIAL IN PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY.
- (2) LIMITS INQUIRIES ON OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES SUB-VERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS, FRONT ORGANIZATIONS, PRIVATE FOREIGN TRAVEL, UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS IN U. S. WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE USSR, ITS SATELLITES, OR COUNTRIES UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL.
- (3) PRECLUDES PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS FOR SENSITIVE ASSIGNMENTS AND RELATED MATTERS.
- (4) PRECLUDES THE USE OF THE POLYGRAPH AS AN AID TO INVESTIGATIONS.
- (5) LIMITS THE USE OF AN EFFECTIVE PERSONAL HISTORY
 STATEMENT.

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- (6) ADVERSE EFFECT ON FIELD INVESTIGATIONS.
- (7) SOME LIMITATIONS ON INTERROGATIONS FOR MIS-CONDUCT WHICH MAY INVOLVE NATIONAL SECURITY.

E. EXCEPTIONS

FBI, CIA AND NSA - DOES NOT PRECLUDE THESE AGENCIES FROM REQUESTING AN EMPLOYEE OR APPLICANT
TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH TEST OR A PSYCHOLOGICAL TEST
WHEN SUCH TEST OR INFORMATION IS REQUIRED TO PROTECT
THE NATIONAL SECURITY.

OTHER MEMBERS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY NOT EXCEPTED. THEY RECEIVE THE MOST SENSITIVE INFORMATION FROM CIA.

